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Abstract:  What is the magnitude of credit constraint or credit gap
affecting small businesses?  This paper provides estimates of credit gap,
defined as the difference between the desired and actual levels of debt for
credit-constrained small businesses using the data from the National
Survey of Small Business Finances.  The estimated credit gap is
approximately 20 percent – credit constrained small business on the
average would desire 20 percent more debt.   This credit gap varies
considerably across industries, with service, manufacturing, and wholesale
industries facing a significantly larger gap than firms in other industries.
Evidence also indicates that relationship banking helps to narrow the
credit gap.  From a policy perspective, our results indicate that credit
policies will be more effective if they are customized to industry needs.
1. Introduction
A growing body of empirical literature on small business lending suggests that
credit constraint affects a significant proportion of small businesses; yet there is little
evidence on the magnitude of this constraint.
2  A measure of credit constraint (i.e., the
difference between the observed amount of debt and the desired level of debt by a firm) is
particularly important for designing targeted relief policies for small businesses.
The primary purpose of this paper is to estimate the magnitude of credit gap -- the
difference between desired and observed levels of debt for credit-constrained small
businesses.  It is essential to identify all credit-constrained firms in such a study.
However, empirical evidence about credit-constrained firms from loan application data is
inherently flawed, since some credit-constrained firms may not apply for a loan, fearing
denial.  Fortunately, data from the National Surveys of Small Business Finances (NSSBF,
1988–1989 and 1993) provide direct evidence on credit-constrained firms, i.e., firms that3
did not apply for a loan fearing denial, and firms that were unable to acquire the amount
for which they applied.
3
In theory, a significant credit gap is expected for small businesses due to acute
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.  Under information asymmetries,
excess demand for credit is due to the fact that increases in rates of interest will attract
borrowers with higher risk when a lender is unable to distinguish among various
borrowers’ creditworthiness ( Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  In equilibrium, lenders will
resort to rationing credit to their borrowers rather than use the interest rate as a market-
clearing device (i.e., charge the less creditworthy borrowers higher rates of interest to
compensate for the credit risk).
4  Hence, information asymmetry could cause credit
markets not to clear, and some firms to be credit rationed.
Our study extends previous work (for example, see Petersen and Rajan (1994),
Berger and Udell (1995, 2001), Cole (1998)) on small business lending in several ways.
First, we estimate the gap between desired and observed debt for credit-constrained small
firms with a positive demand for debt.  We find that a credit-constrained small firm
desires an average 20 percent more debt.  To the best of our knowledge, evidence on the
magnitude of credit gap at the firm level does not exist.  However, there is extensive
empirical work that estimates a similar gap for households.
5  Our study extends the
liquidity constraint literature from households to small business finances.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
2 See, for example, Jaffee and Modigliani (1966), Jaffee (1971), Slovin and Sushka (1983), King (1986),
Sofianos et al. (1990), Berger and Udell (1992, 1998) and Stein (2000).
3 See questions J53 and J12 of the NSSBF (1993) codebook.
4 Petersen and Rajan (1995) describe that initial asymmetric information creates adverse selection and
moral hazard problems in which banks charge high rates initially and reduce rates in later periods after
borrower types have been revealed.
5 See Hayashi (1985), Jappelli (1990), Duca and Rosenthal (1993), and Cox and Jappelli (1993).4
Second, we provide the first estimates of the selection biases inherent in
quantifying desired debt.  Any attempt to estimate the desired debt requires identifying a
subsample of firms that have positive debt and are unconstrained in the credit market.
Extending the econometric findings to all small businesses, however, requires that we
control for differences between firms that are credit constrained and those that are
unconstrained, and firms that have debt and have no debt.
6  Our estimates of sample
selection term coefficients confirm that the sub-sample is indeed non-random, and that
unobserved factors that increase the probability of holding debt also increase the demand
for desired debt, and unobserved factors that increase the probability of being credit
constrained reduce the demand for desired debt.
Finally, we provide evidence on how credit gap varies by firm characteristics.  For
example, manufacturing, wholesale, and service firms experience the largest credit gap,
and utilities, insurance, and mining firms appear to be unconstrained.  We find that the
more people a firm employs, the greater the extent of the firm’s credit gap.  Similarly, C-
corporations and S-corporations experience a greater credit gap than proprietary and
partnership businesses.  Also, unlike franchised firms, independent credit-constrained
firms would have 21 percent more debt if credit constraints were removed.
Establishing the existence of the credit gap has some important policy
implications.
7  First, a better understanding of the credit gap facing small businesses is
required for targeting businesses that are more vulnerable to changing credit conditions.
Since the magnitude of credit gap differs across firms, policy intervention will be more
effective when targeted toward population groups that are more likely to face binding
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credit constraints.  Empirical evidence on the magnitude at firm level will help in
drawing appropriate tax and transfer policy to aid such small business operators.  Second,
information on the magnitude of credit-constrained small businesses can also affect the
outcome of a monetary policy (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).  For example, the “credit” or
“lending” view stresses the ability of monetary policy to regulate the pool of funds
available to bank-dependent borrowers.
8  Our findings can be used to design monetary
policies that may have a disproportionate impact on borrowers with limited access to
capital markets.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents the background literature
on credit rationing and summarizes empirical work on small business finances.  Section
III presents the empirical model.  Sections IV and V describe the data and empirical
results.  Section VI presents the credit gap estimates, and section VII presents our
conclusions.
2.  Background
Why are small businesses more likely to be credit constrained?  In this section, we
examine this question with an emphasis on how banks have developed mechanisms to
address this issue.  We also provide a survey of current empirical work on small business
lending.
Small businesses are generally characterized by opacity of their operations.
Owners know more about their business prospects and often have no credible
                                                                                                                                                                                                
7 See Kashyap and Stein (2000) for a survey.
8 Romer and Romer (1990); Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993); and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) provide
discussions of the credit view.6
mechanisms to convey such private information to lenders (Leland and Pyle, 1977).  The
resulting information asymmetry is fundamental to understanding why small businesses
are credit rationed.  Mitigating such information asymmetry is beneficial both to banks
and small firms, and over time, sophisticated screening and monitoring mechanisms have
been developed to address this issue.
Collateral and guarantees can be viewed as powerful tools that allow banks to
offer credit on favorable terms to small businesses ( Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester,
1985; Boot et al., 1991; Diamond, 1984).  These contract features may reduce the cost of
intermediation, and banks are in position to assess the value of pledged or guaranteed
assets at lower cost than it can assess the value of the business as an ongoing concern.
Loan commitments and lines of credit provided by banks protect borrowers against credit
rationing, and are based on general market conditions (Melnik and  Plaut 1986 and
Sofianos et al., 1990).  Loan commitments provide protection for the borrower against
credit rationing (Melnik and Plaut, 1986; Sofianos at el., 1990).  Lines of credit are pure
revolving credits that allow the firm to borrow as much of the line as needed at any given
time over a specified time period.  Banks can induce borrowers to reveal their types by
offering them sets of contract terms on commitment -- up-front fees, usage fees, interest
rates etc. (Thakor and Udell, 1987; Boot et al., 1987).  At times, loan commitments may
exacerbate information problems as contracts are signed when limited information is
available.  By the time the funds are drawn down, it is possible that lenders have enough
information to refuse a spot loan on similar terms or that borrowers can risk-shift to take
advantage of the financial contract (Avery and Berger, 1991).7
Banks may also use restrictive loan covenants and loan maturity to solve
information problems.  Such contracts force borrowers to renegotiate the covenants when
a strategic opportunity to enhance the value of a loan arises or the financial condition of
the firm changes (Berlin and Loeys 1988).  Restrictive loan covenants prevent borrowers
from engaging in risk-shifting behavior.  Banks have a comparative advantage over
financial institutions that issue private equity placement or public bonds in renegotiating
and selectively relaxing debt contract covenants (Berlin and Mester 1993).
Loan maturity can also be used to complement covenants.  A sequence of short
maturity credits forces firms to renegotiate all covenants frequently, while covenant
renegotiations can only be triggered by those covenants enumerated in the loan
agreement.  Small firms have less access to long maturity debt because they tend to be
informationally opaque.  In addition, unlike large firms, effective implementation of
ratio-related financial covenants is difficult to monitor because of unreliable accounting
procedures.
A more dynamic and comprehensive tool that banks use to ease the informational
asymmetry is relationship lending.  Relationship lending is a process in which banks,
through continuous contact, gather private information over several years from a
borrowing business.  This information is derived from repayment histories, periodic
submissions of financial statements, renegotiations, visits to banks, and other data
associated with on-going monitoring.
9,  10  For example, banks providing a host of
financial services to a borrowing business may be able to complement the usual
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and Nakamura (1993).
10 See Elsas and Krahnen (1998) for a similar study using German data.8
information on credit balance and transaction activity with payroll data and get a unique
picture of the financial health of the firm.  Information specific to owners can be garnered
from the provision of personal loans, credit cards, deposit accounts, trust accounts, and
investment services.
Empirical evidence on the efficacy of relationship lending has been has been slow
to accumulate, largely due to unavailability of reliable data on small business lending.
Petersen and Rajan (1994) use the NSSBF (1988–1989) to examine benefits of the bank-
firm relationship on credit availability among small businesses.  They find that length of
relationship has little impact on loan rates, but it enhances the availability of funds.  In a
similar spirit, Berger and Udell (1995) find that the length of relationship lowers both
loan rate premiums above the prime rate and the probability of collateral use.  Cole
(1998) also examines the importance of bank-firm relationships to the availability of
credit and, in several ways, extends the works of Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger
and Udell (1995).  He finds that the previous use of a lender as a source of savings
accounts and financial management service increases the likelihood of credit availability.
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) examine the notion of house-bank, which is closely related to
relationship lending using German data.  Harhoff and Korting (1998) use survey of small-
and medium-size German firms to examine the role of lending relationship in
determining the collateral requirements, costs and availability of funds.  Our study
extends this literature in that we not only estimate the credit gap, but also how the
duration of lending relationship affects the credit gap for small firms.9
3. Empirical Model
Our primary goal is to estimate the gap between desired and actual debt for credit-
constrained small businesses.  We consider a firm as having its desired level of debt if it
is not credit-constrained and holds a positive level of debt (Cox and Jappelli 1993).  We
use the estimates of desired debt equation for these firms to forecast the desirable level of
debt for credit-constrained firms with positive demand for debt.  The estimates are likely
to be biased, however, if a variable that affects a firm being credit constrained or having
positive debt also affects the level of desired level of debt.  For example, a firm with a
better relationship with a lender may not only be less likely to be denied a loan but,
relative to firms with similar prospects, may be able to borrow more.  We adopt an
extension of Heckman and Lee’s works by Catsiapis and Robinson (1982), Ham (1982),
and  Tunali (1985) to account for two sources of selection bias, jointly determining
inclusion in a subsample used in estimating the desired level of debt.
To estimate the debt, we use a three-step generalized regression procedure.  The
first equation represents the desired credit equation, and the other two are  Probit
equations that describe the selection rules.
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11 See Cox & Jappelli (1993), Catsiapis & Robinson (1982), and Ham (1982) for empirical examples.10
*
i Y   is the desired debt for the  ith firm, and is observed only for firms that are
unconstrained and have positive levels of debt.  X1i is a vector of credit-demand
determinants, such as firm and owner characteristics and bank-firm relationship variables.
The unobservable indices ti and qi, determine whether a firm holds positive credit and
whether a firm is credit constrained or not, respectively.
We define a firm to be credit constrained if the firm replied in the affirmative to
one of the two following questions.
(i)  “With the most recent loan application, did a bank turn down the loan
application or has the firm been unable to get as much as it applied
for?”
(ii)  “During the past three years, were there times when the firm needed
credit but did not apply because it thought the application would be
turned down?”
Following Cox and Jappelli (1993), we assume that the desired debt for a firm is
observed if the demand for debt is positive and the firm is not credit constrained.
12  X2i is
a vector of credit demand determinants and proxies for the convenience of using credit,
and X3i is a vector of credit demand determinants and proxies for credit constraints.
Convenience and Constraint proxies do not affect the desired debt but affect the
probability of a firm holding credit and being unconstrained, respectively.
Equations 1 through 3 constitute the basic structure of the empirical model.  From
an empirical standpoint, our main result depends on the parameter estimates of equation
                                                                
12 Our specification calculates the credit gap by using firms that are unconstrained and have positive debt as
a benchmark for desired debt. In Appendix 1A we expand our specification to include firms that have no11
(1).  Estimates of equations (2) and (3) provide probabilities of small firms holding debt
and being unconstrained, respectively.  These estimates are used to construct the selection
terms (inverse Mills ratios) to estimate equation (1).  The inverse Mills ratios from
estimates of equations (2) and (3) are used to correct for issues of sample selection.
The two latent variables Ti and Qi admit four categories of firms: a) unconstrained
firms with positive credit (Qi = 1 and Ti = 1), b) unconstrained firms that choose not to
hold credit (Qi = 1 and Ti = 0), c) constrained firms with credit (Qi = 0 and Ti = 1), and d)
constrained firms that do not hold any credit (Qi = 0 and Ti = 0).  The estimation strategy
proposed here is to use the first group (Qi = 1 and Ti = 1) of firms to obtain consistent
estimates of the reduced form of desired credit, taking into account the two sources of
selection bias.
The expectation of desired credit for the first group of firms
is ) 1 , 1 | ( ) 1 , 1 | ( 1 1 1
* = Q = T + = = Q = T i i i i i E X Y E e b .  We further assume that each error
term is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
2
i s (i=1,2,3).  Using the
standard  Probit normalization ) 1 ( 3 2 = =s s , one can obtain consistent estimates of
2 b and 3 b .  The final estimation equation of 
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where  ) ( ) ( i i t t f F  and  ) ( ) ( i i q q f F are the inverse Mills ratios.  The f(.) and F(.) are
the probability and cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
                                                                                                                                                                                                
debt and yet claim that they are not credit constrained into our benchmark. The coefficient estimates
between both specifications are qualitatively similar.12
evaluated at the Probit.  The r12 and r13 are the correlation between e1 and e2, and e1 and
e3, respectively.  The probability of being in the sample is F(qi)* F(ti).
Credit gap for a sample of firms is defined as the difference between the average
desired debt 




c D  is the average desired debt of
credit-constrained firms can be written as  1
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c c X D = .  Equation (4) provides the
estimates for  1 b , and  Xc the mean of the vector of observable variables for the
constrained firms, is constructed from the NSSBF data set.  Credit gap is estimated as the
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We use the data from the National Survey of Small Business Finances (1993), a
survey administered by the Federal Reserve Bank.  After accounting for missing data our
final sample has 4,348 observations out of 4,637 original observations in the NSSBF
(1993).
14  The final sample includes 3,355 firms with debt and 2,432 firms that are credit
constrained.
15, 16
Our primary focus is to estimate the magnitude of the credit gap small businesses
face, and how “relationship characteristics” may affect small businesses’ borrowing
                                                                
13 We define actual debt (or credit) as the combined amount of total loans, mortgages, notes, bonds, and
capital leases.
14 The variable representing the length of relationship with a primary lender has 221 missing observations,
the checking account dummy variable has 151, the number of financial services from a primary lender has
98, and the years of owner experience has 18 missing observations.
15 We define debt (or credit) as the combined amount of total loans, mortgages, notes, bonds, and capital
leases.
16 We define a firm to be credit constrained if the firm replied affirmatively to one of the two following
questions.  “With the most recent loan application did a bank turn down the loan application or has the firm
been unable to get as much as it applied for?” and “During the past three years, were there times when the
firm needed credit, but did not apply because it thought the application would be turned down?”13
behavior.
17  To estimate the credit gap, we first need to estimate equations (2) through
(4), while controlling for the appropriate relationship, firm and owner characteristics
(Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Cole, 1998; and Berger and Udell, 1995).  We group the
control variables into three categories—relationship, firm and owner characteristics.  In
addition, the estimating procedure requires identifying variables that may affect the
probability of holding debt and the probability of being credit constrained, but not
necessarily the demand for desired debt. We call these variables “Constraint” and
“Convenience” proxies, respectively.
The relationship variables, such as the length and types of pre-existing
relationships, may influence the interactions between borrowers and lenders.  The
number of years of relationship with primary lender variable is a good proxy for the
amount of private information a lender may have about a borrower’s business.  Such a
pre-existing relationship generates information regarding a firm’s credit-worthiness (See
Foglia, Laviola and Reedtz, 1998; Farinha and Santos, 2001; Harhoff and Korting, 1998;
Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995).
Lenders can also monitor a borrower’s business through various financial services
they provide—sometimes referred to as scope of relationship (Boot, 2000) and, in some
instances as the  multiplexity of relationship (Uzzi, 1999).  For example, a bank that
extends (exclusive) checking services to a firm has access to a very reliable and important
source of information.  Movements in checking account balances are closely related to
changes in a firm’s accounts receivables and inventories, and checking accounts data can
provide a relatively cost effective way to monitor the business activities of a borrowing
                                                                
17 Credit gap is the difference between estimated desired debt and actual debt.14
firm (Mester, Nakamura, and Renault, 1998).  We also control for the number of financial
sources from which a firm borrows.
18  The number of financial sources used may indicate
a firm’s inability to meet its credit requirements from its primary lender (Haines, Riding
and Thomas, 1991).
  Firm characteristics, such as firm age, total liabilities, profit and sales as
percentage of total assets, is another set of control variables that we use.  Age of the firm
may proxy for public information about the firm, and its ability to overcome problems
associated with new businesses (Dunkelberg, 1998).  The sales-asset ratio indicates how
does a firm fare in its product markets.  A firm with greater sales to asset may be less
likely to be credit constrained and more likely to have credit because greater sales require
greater liquidity.  Similarly, a profitable firm may be less likely to face a credit constraint,
and banks would be more willing to lend to it.  In addition, banks incorporate firm
delinquency on business obligations.  Such delinquency may signal a firm’s existing and
potential credit problems.  We also include dummy variables for a firm’s organizational
form.
We also use owner characteristics as a set of control variables in our regressions.
It is widely considered that small business loans are similar to consumer loans, and there
is the lack of distinction between business and owner for legal and tax purposes.  We
include ownership characteristics, such as the ethnicity of owners, dummy variables
indicating their bankruptcy and delinquency on personal obligations (Blanchflower et al.,
1998; Cavalluzo & Cavalluzo, 1998).  Banks may also consider owners’ experience as
their ability to manage firms in difficult product and credit market conditions.
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The estimation procedure also requires identifying variables that may affect the
probability of holding debt (equation (2)) and the probability of being credit constrained
(equation (3)) but not necessarily the demand for desired debt (equation (4)). We call
these variables convenience and constraint proxies.
19  Constraint proxies try to capture
variables that may affect the probability of being credit constraint.  Similarly,
convenience proxies try to capture the likelihood of using debt - firms for which the
“convenience” of using debt is relatively high.
We use information on trade credit denial and payments to partners for our
constraint proxies. Firms that have a history of trade credit denials may be more likely to
be credit constrained.  Firms with a history of significant payments to partners may be
able to reorganize these payments and avoid being credit constrained. Information on
firm’s use of credit cards and the magnitude of internally available funds (sum of retained
earnings, checking and saving account balances relative to assets (BALANCE)) are used
as our convenience proxies. Each of these variables makes it possible for a firm to do
businesses without explicitly borrowing banks.
Table 1 presents some univariate summary statistics of firm, owner, relationship
characteristics, and constraint and convenience proxies for all firms and for firms in the
four regimes—constrained and unconstrained firms, and firms with debt and without
debt.  Most firms have been in business for 11 years, and the years of relationship with
the primary lender and the percent of firms with checking account do not differ across
four regimes of firms.  Sales average about five times total assets for firms that hold debt
                                                                                                                                                                                                
profitability for Norwegian publicly listed firms.16
and are credit constrained, nearly eight times for firms that do not have debt, and six
times for unconstrained firms.  Debt holders and credit-constrained firms have a larger
share of liabilities and lower profits than do other firms.  Proportionately more debt
holders and credit-constrained firms are delinquent on business obligations.  However,
more proprietary firms do not have debt and are unconstrained.  We also find that firms
holding debt and credit-constrained firms are more alike in two respects—number of
borrowing sources and number of financial services from their primary lenders.
Compared with owners of unconstrained firms, nearly twice the owners of
constrained firms are delinquent on personal obligations and have some judgment
rendered against them.  More African-American firms are credit constrained, and nearly
one-fifth of businesses run by females are credit constrained.  The BALANCE and
payment to partners as percent of assets, respectively, are the lowest for debt holders and
credit-constrained firms.  A greater proportion of firms uses business credit cards and was
denied trade credit.  Personal credit card usage is similar across all four regimes of firms.
5.  Estimation Results
As explained above, the results attempt to explain the effect of relationship on
small business borrowing behavior in three different ways: (1) the probabilities of being
credit constrained, (2) the incidence of debt, and (3) the demand for desired debt.  We
then use these estimates to compute the credit gap in the next section.
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produce unreliable estimates. However given the interrelationships between holding debt, being credit
constrained and the optimal level of debt, it is difficult to identify these proxies in it’s purest sense.17
Table 2 highlights the effect of lending relationships on a firm being credit
constrained.  We find that the greater the length of relationship between firms and banks,
the lower the probability of firms being credit-constrained.  At the mean value of years of
relationship with primary lender, one percentage increase in years of relationship lowers
the probability of credit constraint by 2.1 percent.  While older firms face a lower
probability of being credit-constrained by a magnitude 2.7 percent, firms delinquent on
business obligations increase their probability of being credit-constrained by 15.4
percent.
Empirical results also indicate that owner characteristics play a significant role in
credit availability to small businesses.  Judgment against owner and owner delinquency
increase the probability that firms will be denied credit by 10.6 and 8.9 percent,
respectively.  The empirical evidence also indicates that businesses owned by African-
Americans are more likely to be more credit constrained than other small businesses, by
about 12.3 percent.  Trade-credit-denied variable increases the probability of being credit
constrained by 16.9 percent.
Table 3 presents Probit results of relationship variables on the incidence of debt.
Using more services from the primary lender increases the probability of holding debt,
and older firms are less likely to hold debt.  The probability of holding debt increases
with a liabilities to asset ratio and decreases by 0.2 percent with sales to asset ratio.  A
greater profit as percent of assets decreases the probability of holding debt by 0.3 percent.
Firm owners with more years of experience are less likely to hold debt.  We also find that
firms owned by African-Americans and females have significantly lower probabilities of
holding debt -- 5.2 and 4.2, respectively.  The coefficient on the dummy variable for18
personal credit cards used for business is significant and, as expected, increases the
probability of holding some debt by 3.9 percent.
Table 4 presents estimates of the regression for desired debt.
20  There are two
main results of this regression.  First, we find that relationship matters.  Our results show
that the length of relationship with a primary lender matters more than the firm’s age.
One percent increase in the length of relationship with the primary lender increases the
debt-asset ratio by three percentage points, while firm age does not have any significant
effect.  Though checking accounts do not affect the demand for debt, we find that using
transaction and trust services decreases the demand for debt -- firms with deep pockets
have lesser demand for debt.
Our results suggest that both sources of censoring render the sample nonrandom.
The sign pattern for the selection terms confirms with intuition.  The positive coefficient
for the selection term for debt incidence implies a positive correlation coefficient between
errors in the  Probit for incidence of debt and the regression for desired debt.  As
expected, the results confirm that the unobserved factors that increase the probability of
holding debt also increase the demand for desired debt.  The coefficient on the credit-
constrained selection term implies a negative correlation between  unobservables in the
Probit for being constrained and those in the regression for desired debt.  Therefore, the
unobserved factors that increase the probability of being credit constrained reduces the
demand for desired debt.19
6. Quantifying the Credit Gap
Credit gap for a sample of firms is defined as the difference between the average
desired debt 




c D  is the average desired debt of
credit-constrained firms with debt can be written as  1
* b
)
c c X D = .  Table 4 (the results from
Equation 4) provides the estimates for  1 b , and  Xc the mean of the vector of observable
variables for the constrained firms, is constructed from the NSSBF data set.
Results indicate that credit-constrained firms with positive demand for debt have
an average desired debt of $1,357,701.  However, we find that there is a substantial
variation in the desired debt across the sample.  For example, service firms have the
lowest average desired debt level of $764,836, but manufacturing firms have the highest
levels of debt of $3,006,222 (see Table 5).  Desired debt also varies substantially across
the size of a small business.  Small businesses that employ more than 99 employees have
an estimated desired debt of $5,064,747, but this desired debt falls to $1,875,420 for
firms employing 50 and 99 employees.  Similarly, desired debt for S corporations is
about two-thirds of what C corporations have (see Table 5).
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), and is reported in column 5 of Table 5.  Our estimates
indicate that small businesses would acquire an average 20 percent more debt if the credit
constraints were removed.  The credit gap, however, varies significantly across
industries.  Credit-constrained manufacturing firms would acquire nearly half of their
                                                                                                                                                                                                
20 We also run a regression with data on firms that are only credit constrained.  Table 1A in appendix
presents the results.  Most of the coefficient estimates are comparable to the estimates presented in Table 4.
21 We define actual debt (or credit) as the combined amount of total loans, mortgages, notes, bonds, and
capital leases.20
actual debt more if constraints were removed, whereas debt levels should go up by 27 and
23 percent in the wholesale and service sectors, respectively.  Results also indicate that
the utilities, transportation, insurance, mining, and retail sectors of small businesses
experience no significant credit gap.
Given that our findings pertain to an era of serious credit tightening (Berger, Kyle
and Scalise, 2000), it is not surprising that the manufacturing sector was severely credit
constrained.  In fact, findings  from both  Bernanke,  Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) indicate that, following a tightening of monetary policy,
small firms are disproportionately affected.  Results on the utility sector may be due to
the nature of business in that sector, which are usually not affected by general credit-
tightening policies.  For example, Krishana,  Rajan and  Zingales (1999) find that the
utility sector, which normally enjoys a natural monopoly, requires little external
financing relative to firms in other sectors.
Box-and-whisker plots are useful to visualize the distribution of the desired debt
across each industry (see Figure 1).  The graph plots the median, the upper (.75 quartile),
and the lower quartiles (.25 quartile) of the distribution with adjacent and outside values.
The adjacent values are upper or lower quartile plus or minus 1.5r, where  r is the
interquartile range.  The outside values, if any, are values beyond the adjacent values, and
are graphed individually.  Figure 1 shows that there are distinct differences in the median
values of the desired debt across industries.  Individual series have been skewed
somewhat, and in some cases, the long appendages indicate presence of long tails.  The
upper and lower quartiles also differ across the industries.  More importantly we do not
observe many outliers—we record just two outside values.21



































Figure 1:  Box-and-whisker plots of desired debt for 1-digit industries; 1 =
Mining, 2 = Construction, 3 = Manufacturing, 4 = Utilities & Transportation, 5 =
Wholesale Trade, 6 = Retail Trade, 7 = Insurance, and 8 = Service.
7. Conclusions
Our findings indicate that credit-constrained small businesses face an average
credit gap of 20 percent.  The magnitude of credit gap varies considerably across
industries, size of firm, and the nature of business organization.  Manufacturing firms
face an average credit gap of 46 percent, while the credit gap for services and wholesale
firms is estimated at 23 percent and 27 percent, respectively.
The methodology used to obtain the results accommodates the nonrandom nature
of the subsample (selection biases) used to estimate the firm’s demand for desired debt
(i.e., firms that have positive debt and are not credit constrained).  We achieve this by
adopting an extension of Heckman’s correction procedure for multiple selections.  We
find that the both sources of sample selection bias—the unobserved factors that increase22
the probability of holding debt and the unobserved factors that increase the probability of
being credit constrained—are statistically significant.
Results also indicate that small firms with intrinsically strong preferences for
holding debt are more likely to be constrained.  As expected, firms with limited credit,
shorter histories, and poor financial statements face tighter credit situations, consistent
with various theoretical models of credit availability (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989,
1990; and Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
Consistent with previous finding on the importance of relationship lending, we
find that preexisting relationships play an important role in firms being credit constrained
and holding debt.  Bank-borrower relationships generate valuable private information
about the firm’s financial prospects.  Results also indicate that owner characteristics
affect the credit gap—firms run by delinquent owners, owners with judgment against
them, and owner-managers are more likely to be credit-constrained with larger credit
gaps.
We also find that controlling for firm and owner characteristics explains much of
the observed difference in access to credit between minority and other firms.  Even after
accounting for firm and owner characteristics, a significant race effect remains, which is
consistent with recent studies that have examined the role of discrimination in the small
business credit market (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998, and Blanchflower, Levine, and
Zimmerman, 1998).
From a policy perspective, our results indicate that credit policies may be more
effective if they are customized to industry needs.  The magnitude of credit gap differs
substantially across firms from different industries and of sizes.  Before drawing an23
initiative to promote availability of credit to small businesses in economic downturns, our
study indicates that an effective segmentation of small businesses according to their
expected credit gaps would be essential to alleviate credit crunches.24
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Appendix I
Derivation of Econometric Model
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The tobit regression for the sub-sample can be written as:
) , | ( ) , | ( 1 1 1 1
'
1 1 1 N X E X N X Y E e s b + =   (6)
where the conditioning argument N denotes the joint outcomes of the two selection rules.
If  0 ) , | ( 1 1 „ N X E e , then a Tobit regression with the relevant sub-sample will result in
inconsistent estimates.  We require some additional structure on the conditional
distribution of residuals to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters.
Let x = (e1, e2, e3)', and assume ei ~ N(0, S), for i = 1,2,3, independent across
firms, and of the right hand side variables.23  Our data set allows full information on the
outcomes of the two selection rules, giving four distinct groups of firms.  Given the
trivariate normal specification, the probability density function for
*
i Y can be computed for
each group.
For ti = qi = 1, equation (6) can be rewritten as
) , | ( ) , | ( 3 3 2 2 1 1 1
'
1 3 3 2 2 1 C C E X C C Y E - > - > + = - > - > e e e s b e e  
The conditional expectation on the right hand side for a trivariate normal specification is:
                                                                
22 Appendix I is based on Tunali (1985), Ham (1982) and Catsiapis and Robinson (1982). 
23 The residuals are likely to be correlated between individual firms.  The correction for sample selection
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where f (.) and F (.) denote the standard  univariate normal density and distribution
functions, respectively.  ,
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l . The two  l’s are analogous to the inverse Mill’s ratio used in
Heckman’s two step correction for selection bias.  Substitute equation (7) in equation (6),
we get the expression that takes explicit account of two sample selection rules.




1 1 X X P b e b e - > - > = ), ; , ( 12 3 2 r C C G =
where  ) ; , ( 12 3 2 r C C G denotes the standard bivariate normal distribution function (with
correlation coefficient –r12) and ). 2 , 1 ( ;
' = = t X C t t t b  Therefore, we can rewrite equation
(1) as:
1 1 3 13 1 2 12 1 1
'
1 1 V X Y s l r s l r s b + + + =
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1 V X s l g l g b + + + = (8)




1 1 = > > Y Y V E   Tunali (1985) suggests
that given the highly non-linear nature of l2 and l3, one can obtain estimates of l2 and l3
by  univariate probits, and then substitute the estimated value in equation (9) to obtain





Holders Constrained  Unconstrained
Total Number of Observations 4,348 3,355 993 2,432 1,916
    Ln (Assets) 12.14 12.48 10.96 12.57 11.58
(2.50) (2.21) (2.17) (2.32) (2.16)
    Liabilities/Assets 0.65 0.72 0.43 0.76 0.51
(1.35) (0.87) (2.30) (1.74) (0.55)
    Sales/Assets 5.75 5.05 8.11 5.33 6.29
(11.69) (10.21) (15.40) (11.01) (12.48)
    Profits/Assets 0.75 0.50 1.59 0.55 1.01
(4.67) (3.25) (7.61) (3.50) (5.80)




(0.68) (0.68) (0.79) (0.46)
    Ln (Firm Age) 2.43 2.42 2.46 2.38 2.49
(0.81) (0.81) (0.82) (0.80) (0.82)
    Firm Delinquent 860 704 156 661 199
    Proprietary 1,330 877 453 597 733
    S-Corporation 1,056 873 183 642 414
    Corporation 1,646 1,367 279 1,025 621
    Independent 4,161 3,182 979 2,328 1,834
    Ln (Years of Experience) 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.79 2.84
(0.67) (0.65) (0.71) (0.65) (0.69)
    African American Owners 395 280 115 269 126
    Female Owners 779 554 225 406 373
    Owner Delinquent (Personal) 541 414 127 396 145
    Owner-Manager 3,495 2,646 849 1,936 1,559
    Judgment against Owner 226 178 48 168 58
    Owner Bankruptcy 119 90 29 64 55
    No. of Financial Institution 2.39 2.60 1.67 2.73 1.96
(1.63) (1.68) (1.16) (1.79) (1.89)
    No. of Services from Primary Lender 3.29 3.64 2.13 3.85 2.59
(0.37) (0.36) (0.41) (0.33) (0.42)
    Ln (Years with Primary Lender) 1.85 1.82 1.92 1.76 1.96
(0.89) (0.88) (0.94) (0.87) (0.92)
    Checking Account 4,076 3,113 963 2,248 1,828
    Transaction Service 1,345 1,136 228 475 874
    Trust Service 835 675 130 289 540
    Trade Credit Ever Denied 331 277 54 277 54
    Partners' Payment/Assets 0.36 0.28 0.61 0.26 0.48
(2.65) (1.67) (4.58) (1.43) (3.64)
    Credit Card - Business 1,430 1,183 247 910 520
    Credit Card - Personal 1,594 1,269 325 965 629
    BALANCE/Assets 0.67 0.52 1.16 0.50 0.88
(3.23) (2.04) (5.53) (1.91) (4.33)
! 
Of 2,432 firms 2,090 credit constrained firms have positive amount of debt. 
!! 





Firm, Owner, Relationship Characteristics and Proxies
This table provides the mean of each variable for all firms, and for firms in four regimes - firms with
debt and no debt, constrained and unconstrained firms. The first panel lists firm characteristics,
followed by owner, bank relationship characteristics and constraint and convenience proxies. Debt is
defined as the combined amount of total loans, mortgages, notes, bonds and capital leases. BALANCE
is a sum of checking, savings balances and retained earnings. Standard deviations are given in the
brackets.
Firm Characteristics31
Coefficient SE Marginal Effect 
Firm Characteristics
  Liabilities/Assets 0.229 *** 0.043 0.090
  Sales/Assets -0.001   0.002 -0.001
  Log (Firm age) -0.068 * 0.037 -0.027
  Profits/Assets -0.002 0.005 -0.001
  Corporation  0.100 ** 0.044 0.039
  Firm Delinquent 0.409 *** 0.063 0.154
Owner Characteristics
  Log (Years of Experience) -0.048   0.039 -0.019
  Owner-Manager 0.077   0.053 0.030
  African-American 0.328 *** 0.078 0.123
  Gender (Female Owner) -0.083 0.054 -0.033
  Owner Delinquent 0.233 *** 0.076 0.089
  Owner Bankruptcy -0.092 0.118 -0.036
  Judgement against Owner 0.281 *** 0.108 0.106
Relationship Characteristics
  Checking Accounts -0.101   0.090 -0.039
  No. of Financial Institutions 0.002 0.017 0.001
  Log (Years with Primary Lender) -0.055 * 0.029 -0.021
  No. of Services from Primary Lender 0.258 *** 0.016 0.101
Constraint Proxies 
  Trade Credit Ever Denied 0.461 *** 0.098 0.169
  Partners' Payment/Assets -0.019   0.014 -0.008
Log likelihood -2,534     Pseudo R2 0.15
Prob > Chi squared 0      Total obs 4,348
*, **, and *** signify significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Table 2
Probit Estimates: Presence of a Credit Constraint
The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is credit constrained, 0 otherwise. The independent
variables are firm, owner, relationship characteristics and constrained proxies. The regression
includes a constant. The marginal effect for dummy variables are the discrete change in them
from 0 to 1, and for all other variables it is computed at their mean values. The following are
the estimates of equation (3). 32
Coefficient SE Marginal Effect
Firm Characteristics
  Liabilities/Assets 0.076   0.063 0.020  
  Sales/Assets -0.007 ** 0.003 -0.002
  Log (Firm Age) -0.080 * 0.044 -0.021
  Profits/Assets -0.011 * 0.006 -0.003
  Corporation 0.096 * 0.051 0.025
  Firm Delinquent 0.057 0.069 0.015
Owner Characteristics
  Log (Years of Experience) -0.057   0.044 -0.015
  Owner-Manager -0.094 0.062 -0.024
  African-American -0.184 ** 0.077 -0.052
  Gender (Female Owner) -0.153 *** 0.057 -0.042
  Owner Delinquency 0.020   0.079 0.005
  Owner Bankruptcy  -0.041 0.135 -0.011
  Judgement against Owner 0.057 0.104 0.015
Relationship Characteristics
  Checking Accounts -0.183   0.115 -0.045
  No. of Financial Institutions 0.059 ** 0.027 0.016
  Log (Years with Primary Lender) -0.005   0.034 -0.001
  No. of Services from Primary Lender 0.296 *** 0.023 0.078
Convenience Proxies
  Credit Card/Business 0.001 0.052 0.000
  Credit Card/Personal 0.152 *** 0.048 0.039
  "Balance"/Assets -0.020   0.015 -0.005  
Log likelihood -1,971     Pseudo R2 0.16
Prob > Chi squared 0      Total obs 4348
*, **, and *** signify significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent.
Table 3
Probit Estimates: Incidence of Debt
The dependent variable is 1 if the firm has debt, 0 otherwise. The independent variables are
categorized as firm, owner, relationship characteristics andconvenience proxies. The regression also
includes a constant. The marginal effect for dummy variables are the discrete change in them from 0




  Log (Assets) -0.055 *** 0.007
  Sales/Assets -0.003 ** 0.001
  Log (Firm age) 0.010 0.019
  Profits/Assets -0.018 *** 0.003
  C-Corporation -0.013 0.046
  S-Corporation 0.022 0.047
  Proprietary 0.008   0.046
  Franchise 0.024 0.050
  Firm Delinquent -0.428 *** 0.049
Owner Characteristics
  Owner-Manager -0.155 *** 0.030
  African-American -0.580 *** 0.054
  Asian/Pacific Islander 0.071 * 0.040
  Gender (Female Owner) -0.064 ** 0.030
  Owner Bankruptcy 0.082   0.066
  Owner Delinquent -0.218 *** 0.049
  Judgement against Owner -0.291 *** 0.068
Relationship Characteristics
  Checking Accounts -0.038   0.049
  No. of Financial Institutions 0.000   0.012
  Log (Years with Primary Lender) 0.030 * 0.017
  Transaction Services -0.109 *** 0.030
  Trust Services -0.145 *** 0.035
Selection Term - Credit Constrained -3.037 *** 0.183
Selection Term - Incidence of Debt 5.403 *** 0.474
Total obs 1,265 R2 0.25
*, ** and *** are significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent.
Table 4
OLS Estimates: Determinants of Firms' Debt
The dependent variable is the debt/asset ratio. The subsample includes
observations on firms that have debt and are not credit constrained. The
regression also includes seven industry dummies based on one digit SIC code,
and six of them are significant. The Mills ratios are computed from the Probit











Mining 15 9,723 9,135 106%   
Construction 239 602 492 122%   
Manufacturing 311 3,006 2,053 146% ***
Utilities & Transportation 99 1,281 1,917 67%   
Wholesale Trade 219 1,593 1,253 127% *
Retail Trade 440 1,019 937 109%   
Insurance 124 1,594 1,594 100%   
Service 642 765 622 123% **
Firm Size by Employment
0 - 19 1,107 207 234 89%   
20 - 49 254 787 716 110%   
50 - 99 361 1,875 1,421 132% ***
100 - 499 327 5,064 4,250 119% **
Corporate Governance
Proprietary 452 137 132 104%   
Partnership 146 1,651 2,309 72%   
S-Corporation 573 1,292 1,081 120% **
Corporation 919 1,952 1,469 133% ***
Independent/Franchise
Independent 1,986 1,330 1,101 121% ***
Franchise 104 1,886 1,719 110%   
Overall 2,090 1,358 1,132 120% ***
Table 5
Estimation of Credit Gap
This table presents estimates of the credit gap for constrained firms with
positive demand for debt. The magnitude of credit gap is desired debt as a
percentage of actual debt (See Section 6 for more details). The estimated
credit gap is stratified by industries based on one digit SIC code, number of
employees, and forms and types of corporate goverence. Desired debt is
computed by multiplying predicted debt-asset ratios with total assets. 
1The debt figures are in thousands of dollars. 2 The extent of credit gap is
desired debt as a percentage of actual debt. "***", "**" and "*" signify the




  Log (Assets) -0.059 *** 0.008
  Sales/Assets 0.004 ** 0.001
  Log (Firm age) 0.024 0.020
  Profits/Assets -0.009 *** 0.004
  C-Corporation -0.025 0.048
  S-Corporation 0.017 0.049
  Proprietary -0.011   0.049
  Franchise -0.053 0.053
  Firm Delinquent -0.174 *** 0.047
Owner Characteristics
  Owner-Manager -0.042 0.030
  African-American -0.257 *** 0.049
  Asian/Pacific Islander -0.017 0.138
  Gender (Female Owner) -0.014 0.031
  Owner Bankruptcy -0.246 ** 0.114
  Owner Delinquent -0.072 0.050
  Judgement against Owner -0.121 * 0.071
Relationship Characteristics
  Checking Accounts 0.045   0.051
  No. of Financial Institutions -0.035 *** 0.012
  Log (Years with Primary Lender) -0.005 0.017
  Transaction Services -0.139 *** 0.031
  Trust Services -0.135 *** 0.037
Selection Term - Credit Constrained -2.501 *** 0.223
Total obs 1,265 R2 0.161
*, ** and *** are significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent.
Appendix - Table 1A
OLS Estimates: Determinants of Firms' Debt
The dependent variable is the debt/asset ratio. We present estimates for the
unconstrained firms, which may have zero debt (see the footnote 11).
Excluding constrained firms (unlike the estimates of Table 5) requires using
the Heckman's two step procedure. The regression also includes seven
industry dummies based on one digit SIC code, and five of them are
significant. 